# Signing and scams

import StepVideo from '@/components/StepVideo'

# Signing and scams

A signature is an instruction authorized by your wallet. It may send a payment, give an application permission to spend tokens, or approve an action described in a message. Understanding that instruction is the next step after [understanding what a hardware wallet does](/docs/security).

You do not have to memorize every transaction format. Build one habit: compare the request with the action you intended, and stop when you cannot tell what your approval would permit.

<StepVideo id="course-06-verify" />

## What to check before pressing the button

| Request | What your signature may permit | What to review |
|---|---|---|
| Payment | Moving an asset to another address. | Network, asset, full destination, amount, fee and any total. For Bitcoin, also understand the change. |
| Token approval | Letting a contract spend tokens, potentially later. | Token, spender, allowance and any expiry. An unlimited allowance is a continuing permission. |
| Message | A login, order, permit or another authorization. | The actual purpose, requesting app, permissions and scope. A message can matter even when no coins move immediately. |

Read the complete address. Matching its beginning and end can miss a lookalike. Check a recipient through a trusted channel; a label or familiar logo on the computer does not establish who controls the destination.

KeepKey's display coverage depends on the operation and firmware. A hash or hexadecimal data alone does not explain every effect. If the device cannot show enough information to understand the request, cancel and find a supported, understandable route.

The [device review guide](/docs/desktop/verify-on-device) gives practical checks. [Transactions and fees](/docs/learn/transactions-and-fees) explains signing, broadcast and confirmation as separate steps.

## Where users lose funds

An attacker does not always need to steal a private key. They may persuade the owner to use it for an unwanted action. A hardware wallet can protect its keys while an approved signature still allows funds to leave.

Phishing, malicious approvals, exposed recovery words and recovery mistakes deserve attention alongside physical attacks. [Scam Sniffer's 2024 report](https://drops.scamsniffer.io/scam-sniffer-2024-web3-phishing-attacks-wallet-drainers-drain-494-million/) estimated about $494 million lost across 332,000 addresses to wallet-drainer phishing on EVM-compatible chains. That dataset shows the scale of one attack path; it is not a measurement of all hardware-wallet losses.

Keeping requests understandable is a responsibility of wallet design as well as a habit for owners. Useful explanations and cautious defaults help people make decisions. A harder-to-extract key cannot make a harmful approval harmless.

## Recognize the common approaches

- **Fake support:** a caller, message or site asks you to verify or restore your wallet by sharing recovery words. A name, order detail or knowledge that you own a KeepKey does not authenticate the caller.
- **A misleading signing prompt:** an offer, vote or supposed login actually requests spending authority. Read what the signature does, including permissions that remain active afterward.
- **A substituted address:** clipboard malware or transaction-history spam supplies an attacker-controlled lookalike. Verify the full destination independently and on the device.
- **A fake update:** an unexpected message tells you to install a wallet or firmware file. Start from [the official desktop page](https://keepkey.com/desktop) and the [update instructions](/docs/desktop/firmware).
- **Lost recovery information:** a missing backup or forgotten passphrase can lose access without an attacker. [Check your backup](/docs/desktop/setup/verify-backup) before relying on it.

Recovery words can recreate your wallet elsewhere. Sharing them bypasses the protection you bought the hardware for. Follow the documented [scrambled recovery process](/docs/desktop/setup/cipher-recovery); never send the words to a support agent or enter them into a recovery website.

For specific examples, read [clipboard swapping](/docs/guides/clipboard-swapping), [address poisoning](/docs/guides/address-poisoning) and [staying safe](/docs/learn/staying-safe).

## Software is part of the security boundary

The desktop app prepares requests, retrieves network information and communicates with KeepKey. Dependencies, developer accounts and software updates are therefore part of the threat model. Reviewable software and controlled releases matter alongside the hardware.

The [February 2025 Bybit forensic update](https://www.bybit.com/en/press/post/bybit-confirms-security-integrity-amid-safe-wallet-incident-no-compromise-in-infrastructure-blt9986889e919da8d2) described compromised Safe developer credentials and signers deceived into approving a malicious transaction. It illustrates how infrastructure and authorization failures can affect a custody workflow without extracting a key from a wallet chip.

## What clear signing adds

Clear signing presents an understandable interpretation of a supported request on the signing device. Check which fields the device verified and where the description came from. A readable or authenticated explanation does not certify that the contract is safe, that an investment will hold its value, or that the outcome is guaranteed.

See [signing and approvals](/docs/learn/clear-signing) for the different review types and [release status](/docs/firmware/release-status) for coverage. A familiar app name is never a substitute for reviewing the actual request.

**Continue:** [Offline and air-gapped setups](/docs/security/offline-and-air-gapped) explains what changes when you separate the online computer from signing.
